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There is no doubt that African growth has been slow relative to the rest of the
world, and in a recent paper, Easterly and Levine (1997) provide a provocative explanation
based on the deleterious impact of ethnic fragmentation.  In Easterly and Levine's
explanation, economic policies are important determinants of growth performance, be it in
Africa or in the rest of the world.  In turn, the greater the degree of ethnic fragmentation,
the poorer the policies.  Since ethnic fragmentation is (according to their measure) greater
in Africa, a significant portion (one third) of the difference between the average rate of
growth in sub-Saharan Africa, relative to East Asia, is readily accounted for.
This explanation is generally in accordance with one's a priori views on the bitter
inheritance stemming from the carve-up of the continent by the colonial powers during the
mid- to late-nineteenth century.  It also squares with the view that policies matter for
growth, and that policies have tended to be extremely poor in Africa.  It is also, however,
an explanation that leaves little scope for improvement, in that it is hard to see how a
practical   solution   to   ethnic   fragmentation    can   be  found.   In  other words, if ethnic
fragmentation lies at the heart of Africa's growth tragedy, there is very little, if anything,
that can be done about it.  The tragedy is no longer merely a tragedy, it is the fate of Africa.
This paper questions both the robustness of Easterly and Levine empirical results as
well as whether anything can be said regarding the impact of ethnicity on African countries
based on their data set and model. It also offers some comments on other related
econometric papers devoted to the same topic.2
First, we consider the empirical relevance of their explanation, which runs from
ethnic fragmentation, through poor policies, to low rates of growth.  Second, we consider
whether Easterly and Levine's results, which are based on a sample in which African
countries play an extremely limited role, constitute a solid basis on which to construct an
explanation for the poor growth performance of African countries.
1. Ethnic fragmentation and economic policies: a debatable assumption
In this part we raise three points which render Easterly and Levine's main
assumption regarding the link between ethnic diversity and policies debatable.
An ambiguous indicator of ethnicity
Since Mauro (1993) first used it in a cross-sectional growth regression, the ethno-
linguistic fragmentation index (ELF) constructed by Taylor and Hudson (1972) from a
Soviet Atlas (Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964) has been frequently used in other regressions and
taken as a good synthetic indicator of ethnic diversity. The ELF index is defined as the
probability that two randomly  selected persons of a given country will not belong to the
same ethno-linguistic group. It varies from 0, when there is only one ethnic group, to one
when the number of groups tends to infinity. When there are two groups of the same size
the index equals 0.5. This last case corresponds to polarization, which is thus quite distinct
from fragmentation, although Easterly and Levine use the terms indifferently. Moreover,
polarization, rather than a high level of fragmentation, may be a source of conflict, that is
detrimental to growth.
Other authors have tried to tackle this problem by introducing ethnic fragmentation
as well as ethnic fragmentation squared, expecting a U-shaped relationship (Temple 1998,
on the determinants of growth; Collier and Hoeffler 1998 on the causes of civil war;
Arcand, Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney 1998 on the relation between fragmentation
and polarization): if growth is a decreasing function of ELF until some level and an
increasing function thereafter, it may reflect the negative influence of polarization which
would be the strongest at the turning point. Temple (1998) insists on this assumption and
obtains significant results when testing it.3
Coefficients associated with macro policy variables not reduced when ethnic variables are
included
The crux of Easterly and Levine's argument is that ethnic fragmentation is an
empirically important determinant of economic policies and that poor economic policies,
caused by a high degree of ethnic fragmentation in Africa, are the root cause of Africa's
poor growth performance.  If this argument is correct, then one would expect, when
economic policy variables (fiscal surplus, black market premium, financial depth, number of
telephones per capita) are included, that the effect of ethnic fragmentation on the growth
rate of per capita GDP would disappear, or at least be significantly reduced.  In Easterly
and Levine's results, moving from their regression in which the policy variables are
excluded to that in which they are included, there is almost no change in the point estimate
of the coefficient on ethnic fragmentation (the coefficient is equal to -0.017 in the first case,
while it is -0.016 in the second), and the difference is not statistically significant.  This
comparison is not altogether fair in that the number of observations (country-decades)
included in the first regression is significantly greater than in the second one, owing to
missing variables for the indicators of economic policy.
Reestimation with an homogeneous sample
We therefore re-estimated the regressions corresponding to these two equations
using the more limited sample of the second one. Our Table A provides the results of these
estimations, as well as the two baseline cases in which economic policy variables are
excluded.  Note that, when the policy variables are added in column (3), the coefficient on
ethnic fragmentation, which was equal to -0.019, is now equal to -0.017, a difference in
magnitude which is in no way statistically significant.  It is only when the logarithm of the
number of telephones per worker, which can hardly be construed as a "policy variable", is
introduced into the specification that the coefficient on ethnic fragmentation falls
somewhat, but still not significantly, to -0.012.  Thus, whether one considers the broadest
sample that data availability allows or whether one focuses on the most restrictive sample
to permit meaningful comparisons, the decrease in the coefficient on ethnic fragmentation
that one would expect were Easterly and Levine's line of reasoning correct does not obtain.4
Moreover, it is worth noting that Easterly and Levine test the assumption of a direct
effect of ethnic fragmentation on economic policies by examining the simple correlation
between ethnicity and the various indicators of economic policy.  This seems tenuous, at
best.  It is one thing for a public policy indicator to be correlated with ethnic fragmentation.
It is another for this correlation to hold up once one has controlled for other, more
traditional explanations for the indicator in question
1.
Other tests hardly more conclusive
Temple's regressions may seem favorable to the assumption that ethnic
fragmentation is detrimental to good economic policies. In his growth regressions where
the ethnic fragmentation index enters simultaneously in linear and quadratic form, the
coefficients, which were jointly significant (at the 10 per cent level of confidence) in the
regression without the policy variables, become insignificant when the policy variables are
included. However, the size of the sample is considerably reduced in the latter case. It
should be noted that the link between ethnicity and "policy variables" has also been directly
explored by Temple (1998) in a model including both ELF and ELF squared as well as
other control variables: he finds that the coefficients associated with the ethnic diversity
variables are jointly significant, but that the average level of ethnic diversity of African
countries is well beyond the level (implied by a U-shaped relationship) at which the
deleterious impact of ethnic fragmentation on policy choices is maximized.
Recently, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silva, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) have extensively
explored the link between several indicators of the quality of government (grouped under
five headings: interference with the private sector, efficiency, output of public goods, size
of the public sector and public freedom) and several indicators of social structure, including
the ethno-linguistic fragmentation index. It appears that for most of the indicators of
government quality, the ethnicity variable is indeed significant when GNP per capita is not
included among the control variables
2,  but is usually insignificant when GNP per capita is
included. Despite these results, the authors maintain the hypothesis that ethnic
                                               
1 Besides, and we do not wish to belabor this point : if ethnic diversity determines the policy variables, then
one should be using instrumental variable techniques in which ethnic diversity would be one of several
instruments used to identify the effects of the policy variables on economic growth.
2 There are only two exceptions (among 17 dependent variables taken as "indicators of government
performance") the log of infant mortality and the illiteracy rate. But these exceptions may be due to the
functional form of the relation of these variables –possibly non linear- with the log of GNP per capita.5
fragmentation leads to a lower quality of government, assuming that the level of income per
capita is also adversely affected by ethnicity. They do not, however, present any empirical
support for this hypothesis and moreover ethnic fragmentation is far from being the sole
determinant of income per capita. Thus the results obtained by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silva,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) cannot be considered as a convincing test of the assumption
that ethnicity significantly influences policy…
2. Relevance to Africa
We now raise several points about the relevance to Africa of Easterly and Levine's
study of  the impact of ethnicity on growth
A dummy variable insensitive to ethnicity
First, there is the question of the sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable.  If ethnic
diversity is a significant determinant of growth, and if this variable is significantly larger for
sub-Saharan Africa than for the rest of the sample, then one would expect that its inclusion
in the regression would eliminate, or at least significantly reduce, the magnitude of the
Africa dummy.  As can be seen from Easterly and Levine's results (comparing their
regressions where ethnic diversity is excluded, with the same regressions but in which
ethnic diversity is included), there is no significant change in the magnitude of the
coefficient on the Africa dummy variable (for example it goes from being equal to – 0.014
(t = - 3.24) to being equal to – 0.013 (t = - 2.82). The expected reduction in the magnitude
of the coefficient on the Africa dummy does therefore not obtain.  The same holds for the
in other results. 
3
The African subsample: nine out of forty
It is essential to note that the focal point of Easterly and Levine's argument
regarding Africa is based on regression results carried out on a sample of 172 observations
corresponding to three decades.  It is equally important to bear in mind that this is the most
restrictive sample that is dealt with by Easterly and Levine: it includes the greatest number
of explanatory variables, thus maximizing the probability of there being missing variables
                                               
3 We also note that an Africa dummy appears to be significant in Temple's results along with the ethnic
variables in most of his specifications.6
which lead one to drop a given observation.  Upon inspection of the Easterly and Levine
dataset, it turns out that 27 observations correspond to sub-Saharan Africa, on average 9
for each decade.  There are, to be precise, 13 observations for the 1970s, 13 observations
for the 1980s and a single observation for the 1960s which may be termed African
4,
whereas more than fourty countries are generally classified as sub-saharan African
countries.
While the limited sample size is conditioned by data availability, particularly with
respect to the economic policy variables, it does suggest that caution should be exercised in
interpreting the results.  In particular, generalizing the results to the whole of Africa south
of the Sahara may be stretching the limits of statistical inference too far.
Is Africa specific? An unstable relationship
It may be the case that the African subsample, in and of itself, constitutes a special
case.  This issue lies at the heart of a long-standing debate as to whether one can explain
differences in growth performance on the basis of (i) a general, worldwide model of growth
in which different groups of countries differ in terms of the level of their variables, but in
which the regression coefficients linking the variables in question to the growth rate are
constant, or (ii) a specific model in which the coefficients and structure of the model linking
the explanatory variables to the growth rate are specific to a given region (Guillaumont,
Guillaumont- Jeanneney and Brun 1997).  In econometric terms, the issue boils down to
the stability of the regression coefficients over different subsamples of countries.
Obviously, the criteria by which one assigns a particular country to a given subsample are
not restricted solely to geographical considerations.
While Easterly and Levine do note that their results remain approximately the same
when they focus on the "out of Africa" subsample, they do not present, or mention, results
corresponding to their limited African subsample.  Moreover, they do not perform the usual
Chow tests in order to verify that their estimated coefficients remain stable across African
and non-African subsamples.
                                               
4 The country-decades are as follows: Botswana (70, 80), Ghana (60, 70, 80), Kenya (70, 80), Liberia (70),
Mauritius (70, 80), Malawi (70, 80), Senegal (70, 80), Sierra Leone (70, 80), Sudan (70), Tanzania (70,
80), Togo (80), Uganda (70, 80), Zaire (70, 80), Zambia (70, 80), Zimbabwe (80).7
A series of Chow tests on the stability of the regression coefficients between the
African and out of Africa subsamples, presented in the last line of Table A, reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across subsamples.  The p-values of these Chow
tests are all extremely small
5.
Results from the limited African sub-sample
Given the instability of the regression coefficients, we now turn to regression results
based  on the African subsample itself.
In Table B, our purpose is to re-estimate the Easterly and Levine regressions with
the largest African subsample possible (the regressors are the same as Easterly and Levine.
This implies, as we add explanatory variables, that sample size (for the three decades)
decreases rapidly, going from 68 observations when only the basic determinants of per
capita GDP growth are included, to only 27 when economic policy variables and ethnic
fragmentation are present.   Note that we estimated by pooling data over the three decades,
since the limited sample size when policy variables are included rendered a system of
seemingly unrelated decade-specific equations with cross-equation restrictions on the
coefficients infeasible.  Standard errors were computed using White's heteroskedasticity-
consistent method.
Four results in Table B are worth highlighting.  First, the point estimate of the
coefficient on the ethnic fragmentation variable is much larger (between 3 and 19 times
bigger, depending upon the regression and the sample) in the results based on the (limited)
African subsample than in the full sample. This suggests that the importance of ethnic
diversity in the African context may be underestimated by the Easterly and Levine results,
or perhaps that its impact is overestimated or misspecified in some manner in the out of
Africa subsample.  Second, the log of initial income and the log of initial income, squared,
as well as the log of schooling, are much less important determinants of growth
performance in the African subsample than in the full sample.  Third, the economic policy
variables have much less explanatory power than in the full sample: the fiscal surplus to
GDP ratio and the black market premium, which were highly significant in all equations in
                                               
5 Curiously, Temple (1998) who scrutinized the robustness of Easterly and Levine's results, concluding
favourably, did not raise this point.8
which they appeared in the full sample are now significant only when the log of telephones
per worker is excluded.  Financial depth, which was statistically significant in all equations
in which it was included in the Easterly and Levine full sample, is now only significant in
the equation presented in column (7).
We also examined whether Easterly and Levine's argument, according to which
ethnic fragmentation causes poor economic policies (which is turn cause poor growth
performance) was verified for the African subsample.  As in the previous argument based
on the full sample, we therefore re-estimated all of our equations on the basis of an African
subsample that will remain unchanged across regressions.  This "unchanging" subsample
corresponds to those observations for which data are available both on economic policy
variables and ethnic fragmentation.  This allows one to ascertain whether, for the same
group of observations, inclusion of the policy variables leads to a reduction in the
magnitude of the coefficient on ethnic fragmentation, as Easterly and Levine's argument
would have it.  These results are presented in Table C.  As with (i) the full sample, (ii) the
full sample restricted to the set of observations for which the policy variables and ethnic
fragmentation are available, and (iii) the African subsample that maximizes sample size, the
fall in the coefficient associated with the ethnic fragmentation variable when the policy
variables are introduced is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
There is thus no reasonable sample of observations for which the introduction of the
policy variables leads to the reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient on the ethnic
fragmentation variable which one would expect in light of Easterly and Levine's argument.
Moreover, of the six possible coefficients associated with the three policy variables in the
two regressions in which they are included, only one (financial depth when the log of
telephones per worker is excluded) is statistically significant.  This is in sharp contrast with
the results in the full sample presented by Easterly and Levine, and highlights that the link
between policy and the growth rate of per capita GDP does not obtain in the African
subsample.
Thus, while ethnic diversity may affect economic growth in subsaharan Africa,
Easterly and Levine's econometric results refute their very own hypothesis regarding the
transmission mechanism.9
Concluding remarks
Ethnicity is indeed an important matter, but it is a complex one. We believe that
many of the results presented by the major paper on this topic -Easterly and Levine, 1997-
are both debatable and weak from an econometric point of view. Its points seem well
taken, but its conclusions –that ethnic fragmentation (high in Africa) makes for poor
policies, which lower growth- are extremely fragile and implicitly too pessimistic.
It is not surprising that other studies do not find similar significant results for the
ethnic fragmentation index when it is introduced in cross sectional growth regressions with
appropriate control variables (Sachs and Warner 1997, Rodrik 1998, Guillaumont,
Guillaumont-Jeanneney and Brun 1998).
This does not mean that ethnicity has no effect on growth. More scrutiny needs to
be paid to the channels through which it may affect growth and on the conditions making
its effect more or less strong (a similar opinion is expressed by Temple, 1998). This is the
topic of another paper (Arcand, Guillaumont, Guillaumont-Jeanneney 1998).10
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TABLE A
FULL SAMPLE RESTRICTED TO THOSE OBSERVATIONS FOR WHICH THE ETHNIC
FRAGMENTATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY VARIABLES ARE AVAILABLE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROWTH RATE OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.397 -0.414 -0.338 -0.328
(-3.58) (-3.66) (-3.00) (-3.14)
Dummy for Africa -0.012 -0.013 -0.009 -0.012
(-1.68) (-1.78) (-1.42) (-1.92)
Dummy for Latin America -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010
(-7.76) (-7.30) (-6.09) (-6.12)
Dummy for the 60s 0.017 0.016 0.008 0.007
(4.76) (4.54) (2.14) (2.02)
Dummy for the 70s 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.015
(4.89) (4.97) (4.77) (4.68)
Log of initial income 0.112 0.116 0.104 0.105
(3.91) (3.99) (3.67) (4.00)
Log initial income. squared -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
(-4.11) (-4.18) (-4.11) (-4.70)
Log of schooling 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.010
(2.87) (2.77) (3.08) (2.12)
Assassinations -17.656 -17.655 -18.539
(-1.85) (-2.23) (-2.32)
Financial depth 0.015 0.012
(2.27) (1.88)
Black market premium -0.019 -0.019
(-2.77) (-2.73)
Fiscal surplus / GDP 0.184 0.195
(4.28) (4.41)
Log of telephones per worker 0.005
(2.00)
Ethnic fragmentation -0.020 -0.019 -0.017 -0.012
(-3.07) (-2.90) (-2.81) (-1.86)
R-squared 0.44 0.45 0.60 0.61
No. of observations 172 172 172 172
Chow test of parameter stability based














Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios in parentheses.
Datasource : same as Easterly and Levine.12
TABLE B
AFRICAN SUBSAMPLE THAT MAXIMIZES SAMPLE SIZE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROWTH RATE OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.023 -0.003 -0.051 -0.100 0.486 0.457 0.399 0.722
(0.09) (-0.01) (-0.12) (-0.29) (2.01) (1.75) (1.36) (2.75)
Dummy for the 60s 0.029 0.029 0.014 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.004 0.000
(4.16) (4.15) (1.55) (1.25) (4.07) (3.91) (0.39) (0.02)
Dummy for the 70s 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.009
(2.24) (2.24) (1.62) (1.49) (2.48) (2.53) (1.57) (0.92)
Log of initial income -0.014 -0.005 0.020 0.038 -0.135 -0.126 -0.070 -0.135
(-0.18) (-0.06) (0.16) (0.36) (-1.97) (-1.71) (-0.79) (-2.20)
Log initial income. squared 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.008
(0.21) (0.09) (-0.20) (-0.46) (1.98) (1.73) (0.66) (1.72)
Log of schooling 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.013 -0.048
(1.29) (1.29) (0.40) (0.11) (0.28) (0.43) (-1.32) (-1.53)
Assassinations -156.540 -127.125 -107.401 -165.216 -304.276 -536.191
(-1.16) (-0.52) (-0.63) (-1.42) (-2.44) (-2.12)
Financial depth 0.087 0.014 0.078 0.077
(1.60) (0.16) (2.18) (1.70)
Black market premium -0.028 -0.033 -0.017 -0.017
(-2.31) (-1.71) (-2.63) (-1.71)
Fiscal surplus / GDP 0.257 0.202 0.165 0.052
(2.01) (1.16) (2.28) (0.45)




Ethnic fragmentation -0.061 -0.064 -0.152 -0.206
(-2.78) (-2.79) (-2.49) (-2.94)
R-squared   0.19    0.21    0.45    0.50   0.32    0.34    0.72    0.81
No. of observations 68 67 34 29 64 63 32 27
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios in parentheses.
Datasource : same as Easterly and Levine.13
TABLE C
AFRICAN SUBSAMPLE RESTRICTED TO THOSE OBSERVATIONS FOR WHICH
THE ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY VARIABLES ARE
AVAILABLE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROWTH RATE OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.609 0.693 0.594 0.722
(2.14) (2.58) (1.90) (2.75)
Dummy for the 60s -0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000
(-0.45) (0.23) (-0.01) (0.02)
Dummy for the 70s 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.009
(1.79) (1.59) (1.37) (0.92)
Log of initial income -0.134 -0.148 -0.109 -0.135
(-1.58) (-1.84) (-1.37) (-2.20)
Log initial income. Squared 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.008
(1.47) (1.67) (1.15) (1.72)
Log of schooling -0.003 -0.008 -0.023 -0.048
(-0.23) (-0.71) (-1.04) (-1.53)
Assassinations -383.017 -375.394 -536.191
(-2.36) (-1.98) (-2.12)
Financial depth 0.103 0.077
(2.28) (1.70)
Black market premium -0.013 -0.017
(-1.39) (-1.71)
Fiscal surplus / GDP 0.119 0.052
(1.08) (0.45)
Log of telephones per worker 0.019
(1.90)
Ethnic fragmentation -0.194 -0.216 -0.203 -0.206
(-2.62) (-3.10) (-2.31) (-2.94)
R-squared 0.58 0.65 0.74 0.81
No. of observations 27 27 27 27
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios in parentheses.
Datasource : same as Easterly and Levine.